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Abstract
We examine the impact of incentive compensation on the riskiness of acquisition decisions 
before and after the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). Before SOX, equity-based 
compensation was positively related to changes in risk around acquisition decisions, but 
this relationship weakened after the introduction of SOX. The drop in post-SOX acquisi-
tion-related risk stems from how managers respond to compensation-based incentives in 
the new regulatory environment. We show that executive stock options and pay-risk sensi-
tivity drive post-SOX managerial responsiveness to risk-taking incentives. We also docu-
ment a post-SOX value-enhancing effect on long-term stock-price performance and total 
factor productivity through these same incentive compensation mechanisms. The results 
are robust to selection bias, simultaneity, measurements of risk, and the definition of incen-
tive compensation.
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1 Introduction
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), enacted July 30, 2002, imposed the requirement that both 
Chief Executive and Chief Financial Officer certify the accuracy of financial statements 
(SOX, Section  302) and provide information on the adequacy of their internal controls 
(SOX, Section  404). Since willful violation of SOX attracts criminal charges, corporate 
compliance and executive personal costs have increased (Bargeron et  al. 2010; Arping 
and Sautner 2013; Gao and Zhang 2019; Bloomfield 2021). SOX is also associated with 
a reduction in incentives to undertake risky investment projects (Carter et al. 2009; Chang 
et al. 2012; Cohen et al. 2013; Tang 2014; Kwon et al. 2019).
Despite the documented decrease in corporate risk-taking, SOX does not appear to be 
a panacea for resolving misaligned executive risk incentives, as suggested by the recent 
cases of Wells Fargo and Equifax (Bhagat and Bolton 2019). In this paper, we examine 
the impact of SOX on executive risk-taking incentives by investigating corporate acquisi-
tions. Rather than focusing on the propensity to engage in risky investments, we examine 
the riskiness of investment decisions themselves by focusing on changes in firm risk sur-
rounding an acquisition. We seek to understand how managerial compensation incentives 
changes firm risk surrounding acquisitions before and after enactment of SOX. Using SOX 
as a significant exogenous shock (Hege et al. 2021) allows us to examine how regulation 
can change managerial incentives to bear corporate and personal risk.
Regulatory scrutiny and litigation costs imposed by SOX have reduced the risk-toler-
ance of corporate executives (Bargeron et al. 2010). However, Leuz and Wysocki (2016) 
are critical of earlier studies whose findings can be explained by confounding events, and 
propose that studies make use of cross-sectional variation in sample companies to isolate 
a causal effect of SOX on corporate outcomes. We exploit cross-sectional variation in 
executive compensation incentives and consider how executives respond to these incen-
tives through changes in the riskiness of investment decisions surrounding SOX. In addi-
tion to the previously documented decline in compensation incentives (Chang et al. 2012; 
Tang 2014) and risky investment (Bargeron et al. 2010), we propose that managers respond 
less positively to risk-taking incentives through compensation contracts after the introduc-
tion of SOX. We expect that this diminished the previously documented positive relation 
between equity-based compensation and managerial incentives to undertake risky invest-
ment projects (Agrawal and Mandelker 1987; Datta et al. 2001; Coles et al., 2006).
We focus on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) since they are one of the most value-
relevant investment decisions managers can undertake that have clear announcement and 
effective dates to directly measure changes in risk surrounding the event. In addition, 
acquisition decisions can intensify the agency relationship between managers and share-
holders and accentuate the impact of managerial incentives (Zhao 2013). Yermack (2006) 
argues it is better to examine one-time events to understand the impact of compensation-
based managerial incentives. Harford and Li (2007) also show that post-acquisition stock 
price performance affects the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price movements. In con-
trast, they find no such relation between stock price performance and CEO wealth in the 
case of large capital expenditures.
Our paper makes several important contributions to the literature. First, we show that 
the documented decline in risk-taking activity post-SOX (Bargeron et al. 2010; Gao and 
Zhang 2019; Hege et al. 2021) did not come solely from changes in executive compensa-
tion structure (Chang et al. 2012; Cohen et al. 2013; Tang 2014) but can be explained by 
a change in the way executives respond to risk-taking incentives after the passage of the 
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Act. For the pre-SOX period, we find a positive relation between managerial compensation 
incentives and post-acquisition changes in risk. This is consistent with earlier research that 
shows executive stock options incentivize managers to make riskier M&A decisions (Datta 
et  al. 2001) by increasing the convexity of managerial payoffs (Agrawal and Mandelker 
1987; Coles et al. 2006). However, in the post-SOX period we find a significant weaken-
ing in the compensation-risk relationship. After accounting for changes in executive com-
pensation, our results show that post-SOX executives are less responsive to risk-taking 
incentives, resulting in a decrease in the riskiness of acquisition investments. In robust-
ness tests, we show that managers have become less responsive to risk-taking incentives 
even for the sub-sample of firms that increased incentive compensation post-SOX. This is a 
novel finding regarding the transmission mechanism of reduced risk-taking, post-SOX. For 
instance, Chen et al. (2015) show that the positive relation between executive risk-taking 
incentives and audit fees weakens post-SOX. However, they attribute this to the lower pos-
sibility of financial misreporting in the post-SOX period without providing empirical evi-
dence of reduced corporate risk-taking in relation to managerial incentives. Similarly, Liu 
et al. (2020) associate the reduction in corporate risk-taking with the compensation claw-
back provisions that were initiated post-SOX but they do not examine the role of incen-
tive compensation in this mechanism or the response of managers to risk-taking incentives 
post-SOX.
Second, we show that how managers respond to risk-taking incentives post-SOX is 
driven by their option portfolio. Based on the previously documented positive relation 
between risk-seeking behavior and convex payoffs from executive stock options (Coles 
et al. 2006; Gormley et al. 2013) we examine a rich set of managerial incentives including 
new stock option grants, previously granted unexercised options and total pay-risk sensitiv-
ity (Vega). We find that decreased managerial responsiveness remains significant across all 
option portfolio specifications. On the other hand, we find the managerial common stock 
portfolio does not have a major effect on any change in risk-taking activity post-SOX.
Third, previous studies document a significant decrease in risky investments, post-SOX 
(Bargeron et  al. 2010; Kang et  al. 2010). We complement this research by showing that 
managers select projects of significantly lower risk compared to the pre-SOX period even 
if they have been provided with risk-taking incentives.
Finally, we show that the change in responsiveness of acquiring managers to risk-taking 
incentives has a value-enhancing effect on long-run total factor productivity and share-
holder wealth, primarily through the managerial option portfolio. These findings indicate 
the prevalence of a potentially excessive level of risk-taking before SOX with the mitigat-
ing impact of the Act on managerial risk appetite being beneficial to shareholders.
Our results are robust to controls for selection bias, alternative risk and incentive com-
pensation specifications, controls for the impact of SOX on board governance, and endo-
geneity. We also control for confounding events that could affect acquirer risk and address 
concerns about causality between executive compensation and firm risk.
The empirical evidence suggests that although firms changed the structure of their 
executive compensation contracts post-SOX, corporate executives also changed the way in 
which they responded to the risk-taking incentives provided by equity-related compensa-
tion. Our results have important implications for regulators, policy makers, remuneration 
committees and investors. The passage of new regulation can change the way internal gov-
ernance mechanisms affect corporate decisions reinforcing the regulators’ intended impact 
on corporate policies. Our results show that the effect of SOX is not absorbed immediately 
but has a long-lasting impact on the responsiveness of managers to risk-taking incentives 
and subsequent decision making. Policy makers and remuneration committees should take 
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into consideration the time horizon of proposed reforms which can have further implica-
tions for investors’ risk level of aversion and investment horizon.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 
outlines the data sample and discusses our research design. Section  4 presents and dis-
cusses the empirical results. Section 5 provides further robustness checks. Section 6 exam-
ines the impact of acquisition risk on deal performance and Sect. 7 concludes.
2  Literature review
2.1  Incentive compensation and risk‑seeking incentives
Incentive compensation is widely considered an effective mechanism to influence manage-
rial risk aversion and mitigate agency costs. Smith and Stulz (1985) note that if firms fail 
to provide managers with appropriate incentives via their compensation contract they are 
likely to forego positive net present value projects that increase firm risk. This risk-aversion 
conflict is particularly relevant to firms with high growth opportunities (Smith and Watts 
1992; Guay 1999).
Supporting this theoretical view, Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) find a positive link between 
option-based compensation and R&D expenditures. Rogers (2002) documents a strong 
negative relation between the use of derivatives for hedging purposes and risk-taking 
incentives provided by management stock and option holdings. Francis et al. (2017) finds 
that exchange rate exposure increases with pay-risk sensitivity, and Boone et  al. (2011) 
show that CEO equity incentives are negatively related to the equity risk premium, which 
they attribute to the incentive alignment properties of stock options.
Focusing specifically on M&A transactions, Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) find that 
executive stock and options holdings are positively associated with changes in the variance 
of acquirer stock returns surrounding the deal announcement. Datta et al. (2001) report that 
managers with high equity-based compensation make riskier M&A decisions relative to 
managers with weaker equity incentives and Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) show that 
higher pay-risk sensitivity leads to greater risk-inducing acquisitions in the banking sector. 
Along the same lines, Gormley et al. (2013) argue that managers with less convex payoffs 
tend to engage in more diversifying acquisitions that reduce firm risk.
Recent studies directly analyze the underlying pay-performance (Delta) and pay-risk 
(Vega) sensitivity of compensation contracts and their impact on corporate decision-mak-
ing. Vega is positively related to risky investment spending (Nam et al. 2003; Coles et al. 
2006; Brockman et al. 2010; Chava and Purnanandam 2010, Croci and Petmezas 2015) and 
is negatively related to investment in tangible assets and cash balances (Nam et al. 2003; 
Coles et  al. 2006; Chava and Purnanandam 2010). On the other hand, the same studies 
show that Delta is positively correlated with cash holdings and managerial risk aversion 
and negatively correlated with risky investments, leverage, and stock return volatility.
These studies highlight that not all forms of equity-related compensation are equally 
effective in inducing risk-taking. We expect the effectiveness of stock options and related 
incentives to mitigate risk-aversion is greater than that of common stock, given the con-
vex nature of their payoffs (Guay 1999; Nohel and Todd 2005; Coles et al. 2006). This is 
emphasized in the findings of Billett et al. (2010), who show that while high Vega induces 
managers to take more risk, high Delta promotes managerial risk-aversion. Bhagat and 
Bolton (2019) also find a negative relation between director stock ownership and bank risk.
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2.2  SOX and risk‑seeking incentives from executive compensation
The introduction of SOX and the resulting increased liability on executive directors has 
had an adverse impact on managerial incentives to engage in risky investment projects. 
SOX has led to a significant reduction in risk-taking activity (Bargeron et  al. 2010; 
Kang et al. 2010), corporate credit spreads (Nejadmalayeri et al. 2013), risk asymmetry 
(Bloomfield 2021), exchange rate exposure (Francis et al. 2017; Hege et al. 2021), firm 
opaqueness (Arping and Sautner 2013), and corporate innovation (Shadab 2008; Gao 
and Zhang 2019). On the other hand, Pryshchepa (2021) reports an increase in risky but 
value-enhancing investments post-SOX.
SOX is further associated with a change in the structure of managerial compensation 
incentives that leads managers to undertake risky investment projects. Both Chang et al. 
(2012) and Tang (2014) report a decline in pay-performance sensitivity and the use of 
executive stock options post-SOX. Carter et al. (2009) show that post-SOX, firms placed 
more weight on earnings in bonus contracts. A recent study by Kwon et al. (2019) con-
firms that SOX has increased firm conservatism and led to revisions in executive com-
pensation contracts that reduces pay-performance sensitivity. Along the same lines, 
Benson et  al. (2019) find a reduced role of Delta in compensation post-SOX. Cohen 
et al. (2013) show that SOX led to a reduction in the sensitivity of corporate investment 
to executive compensation.
Following Bargeron et al. (2010) we expect that SOX led to an overall reduction in 
the riskiness of corporate acquisitions, as measured by the post-acquisition change in 
firm risk. However, Leuz and Wysocki (2016) are critical that general studies of SOX 
outcomes are contaminated by confounding events. They argue that researchers should 
focus on such cross-sectional variation in sample firms to isolate a causal effect of SOX 
on corporate outcomes, including for our study the effect on corporate investment. To 
address this concern, we exploit cross-sectional variation in management compensation 
incentives and propose three compensation focused outcomes from SOX.
First, given the positive relation between equity-based pay and investment risk 
(Agrawal and Mandelker 1987; Datta et al. 2001), we expect the reduction in acquisi-
tion risk is concentrated in firms that offer larger equity-based pay components to top 
management. This can arise because of the general reduction in compensation incen-
tives documented in Chang et al. (2012) and Tang (2014) among others. However, we 
extend this and propose that SOX has changed the way managers respond to risk-tak-
ing incentives. Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013) show that differences in the regulatory 
environment affect the way managers respond to incentives embedded in cash bonuses. 
We argue that the increased personal accountability and legal liabilities of managers 
in the post-SOX environment have changed the way managers react to compensation 
incentives that encourage risky investment. This weakens the previously documented 
positive relation between incentive compensation and riskiness of acquisition decisions 
(Agrawal and Mandelker 1987; Datta et al. 2001).
Second, we predict that the change in the relation between equity incentives and risk-
taking is driven by the executives’ option portfolio. This stems from the fact that differ-
ent forms of equity-based compensation affect risk-taking in different ways. Previous 
studies have shown that the convexity of payoffs inherent in executive stock options and, 
subsequently, the pay-risk sensitivity (Vega) of the option portfolio are positively related 
to risk-increasing activity (Guay 1999; Datta et al. 2001; Coles et al. 2006; Cohen et al. 
2013). In contrast, restricted stock grants are less efficient in controlling managerial 
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risk aversion (Smith and Watts 1982) and the pay-performance sensitivity (Delta) of the 
stock portfolio can potentially promote risk avoidance (Nohel and Todd 2005; Bhagat 
and Bolton 2019). Therefore, if SOX has changed the way managers respond to risk-
taking incentives, we expect this change to stem from a weakening in the efficiency of 
executive stock options to control managerial risk aversion.
Finally, we examine the effect of SOX on the relation between compensation incentives 
and the long-run wealth effects of acquisitions. Excessive risk-taking can be value destroy-
ing for acquiring shareholders (Moeller et al. 2005; Bouwman et al. 2009). Our discussion 
that SOX reduces the positive relation from equity-based compensation to risky invest-
ment benefits shareholders only if the change in risk-seeking activity during the post-SOX 
period is specifically restricted to those value-destroying risky investments that were a fea-
ture of the pre-SOX dotcom period highlighted in Moeller et al. (2005). By reducing the 
risk-taking appetite of acquiring managers stemming from their equity-based incentives, 
we propose that SOX has also improved the impact of these incentives on the performance 
of acquisition decisions.
3  Data and research design
3.1  Sample selection criteria
We use SDC Platinum to identify all completed US mergers and acquisitions with an 
announcement and effective date between January 1, 1993 and December 31, 2010.1 Fol-
lowing Aktas et  al. (2013), only those transactions classified as mergers, acquisitions, 
acquisition of majority interests, acquisition of assets, acquisition of certain assets, acquisi-
tion of remaining interests, and exchange offers are included in our sample. The transaction 
must have a disclosed deal value of at least $1 million2; both the bidder3 and target should 
be US firms; the acquirer should be a publicly listed company owning less than 50% of 
the target’s shares six months prior to the announcement and acquiring at least 50% of the 
target’s shares in the transaction. These criteria result in a sample of 28,751 transactions.
We match these transactions to firms in the Standards and Poor’s ExecuComp database 
for executive compensation data. ExecuComp provides compensation data on the top five 
highest compensated executives for firms in the S&P 1500 Index. We require the acquiring 
firm to have executive compensation data available for the year preceding the acquisition 
announcement to reflect compensation incentives at the time of undertaking the acquisi-
tion and to remove changes in compensation following the acquisition. Since ExecuComp 
begins in 1992, the start date of our sample is 1993. Merging with Execucomp reduces the 
1 In robustness tests, we repeat our multivariate analysis confining our sample to a 10-year period sur-
rounding the SOX (1997–2007) to avoid the impact that other confounding events may have on our results 
when the sample period covers an expanded time window. We obtain qualitatively similar results that are 
available in Online Appendix Tables 4a–9a and 11a.
2 All values in the analysis are adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2010 USD based on the consumer 
price index. We repeat the analysis including in our sample only those deals with a value higher than $25 
million. The results are available in Online Appendix Tables 4b–9b and 11b and show that our findings are 
not driven by small deals.
3 We use the terms acquirer and bidder or acquiring and bidding firm interchangeably since all transactions 
in the sample are completed mergers and acquisitions.
How did the Sarbanes–Oxley Act affect managerial incentives?…
1 3
sample to 8179 transactions. We end the sample in 2010 as we expect any SOX-related 
impact on managerial incentives to be fully incorporated by then.
We also require the bidder to have accounting data in Compustat and stock price data 
in CRSP to enable us calculate changes in firm risk. This produces a final sample of 7747 
acquisitions made by 1908 US firms. Unless otherwise stated, we measure all financial data 
at the year-end prior to the acquisition announcement.
3.2  Sarbanes–Oxley and incentive compensation variables
We partition our sample into two sub-periods, the Pre-SOX and Post-SOX period, based on 
whether the acquisition announcement date is before or after the enactment of SOX (July 
30, 2002). In multivariate tests, we define SOX as a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the acquisition announcement date is after the enactment of SOX, and zero other-
wise. We define all variables in Table 14.
We define New_Grants as the Black–Scholes fair value of new option and restricted 
stock grants awarded to the top five executives during the financial year divided by total 
compensation. Since previous studies show that stock options induce risk-taking activity 
more effectively than restricted stock (Smith and Watts 1982; Guay 1999) we further split 
this incentive measure between options and restricted stock components. New_OptionG 
measures the fair value of new executive stock options and New_StockG measures the fair 
value of new restricted stock grants, both scaled by total compensation.
Confining the analysis to new incentive awards ignores the potential impact of previ-
ously awarded incentives on managerial behavior. As managerial incentives stem from 
both new and previously awarded stock and option grants (Guay 1999) we also consider 
the incentive effect of all equity-based awards to the top five executives. New restricted 
stock and option grants typically do not vest immediately,4 meaning that previously granted 
incentives could have a stronger impact on investment decisions today. In addition, if exec-
utives have been granted higher than optimal equity incentives in the preceding years, new 
incentives should be adjusted downwards (Core and Guay 1999). We define Accum_Incen-
tives as the sum of unexercised (vested and unvested) stock options and unvested restricted 
stock held by the top five executives divided by the total number of shares outstanding. 
As with New_Grants, we decompose Accum_Incentives between option and stock grants. 
Unex_Options is the ratio of unexercised stock options divided by the total number of 
shares outstanding and Unvest_Stock is the ratio of unvested restricted stock grants to total 
shares outstanding.
Nevertheless, compensation measures such as the volume and value of stock and option 
grants may not capture efficiently the impact of equity incentives on managerial wealth 
(Core and Guay 2002; Coles et al. 2006). In order to control for this potential bias, we also 
estimate Delta and Vega of stock and option portfolio as alternative and more direct meas-
ures of managerial incentives. We define Delta as the dollar change in top-5 executives’ 
wealth for a 1% change in the firm’s stock price and Vega as the dollar change in top-5 
executives’ wealth for a 1% change in the standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns. 
The calculation of Delta and Vega follows the method developed by Core and Guay (2002) 
and Coles et al. (2006) based on the Black–Scholes (1973) model, as modified by Merton 
4 Malmendier and Tate (2008) report that executive stock options have an average life span of ten years and 
they do not become fully exercisable until four years after the granting date.
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(1973) to account for dividends. We also control for the effect of the non-equity related 
compensation on managerial behavior. Research shows that cash pay can increase mana-
gerial entrenchment and risk aversion, and have a negative impact on firm performance 
(Brick et al. 2006; He 2012). We define Cash_Comp as the sum of salary and cash bonus 
payments to the top five executives of the acquiring firm scaled by total compensation.
3.3  Volatility of acquirer returns
We define acquisition risk as the change in acquiring firm’s total risk surrounding the effec-
tive date. D_Risk is the difference between the post- (+ 1 to + 126 days) and pre- (− 126 
to − 1 days) acquisition standard deviation of stock returns. A positive value indicates an 
increase in total firm risk after the acquisition while a negative value means that the volatil-
ity of stock returns has fallen in the post-acquisition period.
In robustness tests, a second risk variable is constructed following Agrawal and Man-
delker (1987) and Kravet (2014). The variable, D_Risk_AbR, measures the difference 
between the post-effective date (+ 60 to + 185 days) and pre-announcement date (− 185 to 
− 60 days) standard deviation of abnormal stock returns. The pre-acquisition period ends 
60 trading days before the announcement date and the post-acquisition period begins 60 
trading days after the effective date to minimize the impact of acquisition negotiation and 
completion periods on stock return volatility (Kravet 2014). For this measure, we calcu-
late abnormal stock returns as the residual from the market model using the CRSP value-
weighted index.
3.4  Confounding events
The period surrounding the passage of SOX is characterized by a number of confounding 
events that limit the ability of researchers to attribute their findings to the Act (Leuz and 
Wysocki 2016). Among the most important of these were the collapse of the internet bub-
ble in 2001, the passage of SFAS No. 123R (Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation), 
and the 2007–2008 global financial crisis.5 We control for these events to sharpen the focus 
of our own results on the passage of SOX.
Cohen et al. (2013) cite evidence that the strongest impact of the internet crash on US 
firms occurred between August 2000 and August 2001. Therefore, we form a subsample of 
acquiring firms that made an acquisition announcement within the years 2000 and 2001. 
Similar to Cohen et al. (2013), we calculate stock price returns for the bidder subsample 
from August 1, 2000 to August 31, 2001. We then allocate acquiring firms in this subsam-
ple to deciles based on their stock price performance for that period. Based on this method, 
we define Internet_Crash as a categorical variable that takes values from 1 to 10 for acquir-
ing firms with an acquisition announcement date between 2000 and 2001, and zero for any 
other acquirer. Firms in the worst performing decile, and who are therefore most affected 
by the market downturn, are assigned values of 10. We use a similar approach to control for 
the global financial crisis. We build subsamples of acquirers with an acquisition announce-
ment date in 2007, 2008 and 2009 and create a Financial_Crisis categorical variable that 
5 We do not control for the 9/11 terrorist attack since Bargeron et  al. (2010) show that the decrease in 
risk-taking activity in the post-SOX period cannot be explained by any uncertainty about the US economy 
caused by this event.
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takes values from 1 to 10 based on bidder’s stock price performance, and zero for any deal 
outside the period 2007–2009. If these market downturns, rather than SOX, drive changes 
in compensation incentives and acquisition risk, we should find no relation between SOX 
and acquisition risk after controlling for the relevant market downturn.
The Financial Accounting Standard Boards introduced SFAS No. 123R in 2006 and 
required that costs associated with equity-based compensation must be fully expensed in 
the firm’s financial statements. One of the consequences of this regulation is the decrease 
in option-based compensation by public firms (Brown and Lee 2007). Since option grants 
are associated with higher incentives for risk-increasing activity, we expect a decrease in 
the riskiness of firm acquisitions after the passage of SFAS No. 123R. The effective date 
implemented by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the first fiscal quar-
ter of the first fiscal year after June 15, 2005. Thus, we define SFAS_123R as a dummy 
variable set equal to one if the acquisition announcement takes place in 2006, and zero 
otherwise.
4  Empirical results
4.1  Changes in risk and compensation around M&As
Table 1 presents the sample time-series distribution and summary statistics for the main 
risk and compensation variables and classifies them into pre- and post-SOX periods. M&A 
activity increased in the late 1990s prior to the internet crash in 2000 (see Moeller et al. 
2004; Masulis et al. 2007) and declines in the aftermath of the 2001 and 2008 recessions.
The results presented in Table 1 highlight a decline in acquisition risk post-SOX reflect-
ing the high personal costs imposed by the Act on managers for undertaking risky invest-
ments (Bargeron et al. 2010). Although managers appear less risk averse before SOX, after 
2001 D_Risk is negative in all years except the financial crisis period when market volatil-
ity was abnormally high. Before SOX, the completion of an acquisition results in a mean 
increase in stock return volatility of 12.1% while in the post-SOX period the mean increase 
is only 4.9%. The D_Risk_AbR variable shows an even larger difference between pre- and 
post-SOX risk-taking and all differences are significant at the 1% level.
The remaining columns in Table  1 show a notable shift in the structure of incentive 
compensation over time, which is consistent with the documented decrease in the use 
of stock options following the passage of SOX and SFAS No. 123R (Chang et al. 2012; 
Dicks 2012; Tang 2014). New grants of executive stock options fall after the passage of 
the Act (a significant at the 1% level change). While stock options account, on average, for 
37.4% of the top five executives’ compensation before 2002, this falls to 31.1% post-SOX. 
At the same time, we observe a substantial increase in the use of restricted stock with its 
mean value to total compensation rising from 4.3% before SOX to 16.1% post-SOX. As a 
result, the total value of equity-based compensation as a percentage of total compensation 
increases post-SOX, driven by the increase in restricted stock.
This preliminary evidence suggests that the structure of executive compensation 
changed significantly post-SOX. Subsequently, this can affect managerial incentives to 
take risk given that restricted stock is less effective than options in mitigating risk-aversion 
(Smith and Watts 1982; Guay 1999). The change in compensation structure is also consist-
ent with corporate incentives to avoid excessive risk exposure post-SOX (Flor et al. 2014). 
Although the average sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock price performance (Delta) 
was equal across the two periods, the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock return 
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volatility (Vega) jumped in the period after SOX. The average value of Vega increases from 
$264,000 in the pre-SOX period to $680,000 post-SOX and the change is significant at the 
1% level.
We expect the increase in pay-risk sensitivity to be associated with stronger incentives 
for risky acquisitions, all else equal. However, since managers appear to perceive equity 
incentives differently post-SOX as we show in this paper, compensation committees may 
have raised pay-risk sensitivity to avoid undesired risk-aversion following the enactment of 
SOX.
4.2  Control variables
We control for the payment method using the dummy variables Payment_Cash and Pay-
ment_Stock. These are set equal to one if the deal is financed by only cash or equity 
respectively, and zero otherwise. Prior research has shown that bidders who have insuf-
ficient information about the target are more likely to finance the transaction with stock 
(Hansen 1987; Officer 2007) to mitigate information asymmetry problems. Given that cash 
financing is associated with lower information asymmetry, we expect it to result in lower 
stock return volatility following the transaction. We define Size as the natural logarithm of 
the bidder’s market capitalization four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement date. 
Bargeron et al. (2010) document a larger fall in the standard deviation of stock returns for 
small firms relative to large firms following SOX. Sales_Growth is the natural logarithm 
of the ratio of bidder’s sales in the year preceding the acquisition announcement (t − 1) 
to sales in the previous year (t − 2). Since risk-taking incentives are positively related to 
the firm’s investment opportunities (Guay 1999; Benson et  al. 2019) we expect a posi-
tive relation between sales growth and firm risk. Cash/Assets is the ratio of cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets. Yermack (1995) and Dechow et al. (1996) note that liquidity-
constrained firms are more likely to use stock options in executive compensation packages. 
ROA is the bidder’s operating income before depreciation divided by total assets.
We include leverage to ensure any observed change in firm risk is not due to changes 
in capital structure. D_Leverage is the change in the ratio of total debt to total assets from 
the year-end preceding the acquisition announcement to the subsequent year.6 While risk-
averse managers prefer to avoid debt (Berger et  al. 1997), we expect that managers of 
highly leveraged firms have fewer incentives to further increase risk (John and John 1993). 
R&D is the bidder’s research and development expenditure to total assets and we treat 
missing R&D values as zero.7 Investment in R&D can increase with risk-taking incentives 
(Nam et al. 2003; Coles et al. 2006), but Bargeron et al. (2010) find that more specialized 
firms with higher investment in R&D before SOX significantly reduced their risk-taking 
activity post-SOX relative to firms with low R&D. Net_PPE is the acquirer’s net prop-
erty, plant and equipment to total assets. Since this is typically a less-risky investment, we 
expect a negative relation between Net PPE and pay-risk sensitivity.
We also control for a range of corporate governance characteristics that may substitute 
or compliment executive compensation in motivating managers to undertake risky invest-
ments. We control for CEO tenure and predict that entrenchment increases with tenure, 
6 We use the book value of leverage to avoid any changes in the market value of leverage that could be due 
to changes in stock price rather than from deliberate managerial choices (Welch 2004).
7 Our results are unaffected if we exclude observations where R&D data is missing.
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leading to decisions characterized by higher risk-aversion. Tenure is the number of months 
the CEO has served in office at the time of the acquisition announcement. In addition, 
Banerjee et al. (2015, 2018) show that the reduction in risk-taking activity post-SOX can 
be explained by restrained CEO overconfidence. We control for the impact of this factor 
on our results using the variable Overconfidence which, following Banerjee et al. (2015), 
is defined as the value per in-the-money vested option retained by the CEO scaled by the 
stock price of the firm at the end of the fiscal year. The value per in-the-money vested 
option is calculated as the value of all unexercised vested options retained by the CEO 
divided by the total number of these options. For a sub-sample of firms with available 
data in BoardEx we examine the proportion of independent directors on the board, Indep_
Directors, as well as the proportion of independent directors in the audit committee, Audit_
Indep, given the mandate of SOX for audit committee independence (Linck et al. 2009). 
CEO/Chairman is a dummy variable set equal to one if the CEO is also the Chairman, and 
zero otherwise. Among other provisions, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act established a number of 
rules and restrictions with regard to board structure, including the requirement for inde-
pendent boards, to improve the quality of corporate governance. Dicks (2012) shows that 
governance regulation is a substitute for incentive pay as an agency-cost mitigating mecha-
nism whereby the passage of SOX led to a decrease in incentive compensation. Along the 
same lines, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) find that firms who had to implement struc-
tural changes in their boards following the passage of the Act lowered equity-based com-
pensation. Therefore, changes in board structure post-SOX can have an important impact 
on managerial equity-based incentives and their subsequent effect on decision-making.
Table  2 presents summary statistics for our sample variables. The mean and median 
value of new equity grants is close to 45% of total pay, with stock options dominating this 
percentage mainly due to their use in the pre-SOX period as shown in Table 1. The median 
value of both new stock grants and unvested stock is zero since the majority of acquirers 
do not pay restricted stock to their executives until after SOX. Mean and median values of 
Delta and Vega are higher than those in previous studies (Coles et al. 2006; Cohen et al. 
2013) as we examine the sensitivity of top five executives’ wealth to stock price perfor-
mance and volatility, rather than solely that of the CEO.8
Summary statistics for control variables are generally in line with prior studies (Cohen 
et al. 2013; Croci and Petmezas 2015). The average acquiring firm is large, with market 
capitalization of approximately $2.8bn, reflecting the focus on S&P1500 firms in Execu-
Comp. The acquiring firms in our sample are generally profitable and have positive invest-
ment opportunities based on sales growth, R&D and capital expenditures. Median CEO 
tenure is 5.67 years and for 62.3% of the firms in our sample the CEO also serves as Chair-
man. The overconfidence of acquiring CEOs has a mean and median value of 0.40 and 
0.38 respectively, comparable to those reported by Banerjee et al. (2015) for their M&A 
sub-sample. 82.5% (85.7%) of the average (median) firm’s board members are independent 
directors while the mean (median) proportion of audit committee independence is 93.5% 
(100%). This makes sense given that this variable is mainly available for the post-SOX 
period in our sample9 during which SOX requires audit committees to consist entirely of 
independent directors (Linck et al. 2009). Regarding the method of payment, almost half 
8 Coles et  al. (2006) report compensation data for the management team excluding the CEO and so the 
reported dollar values of Delta and Vega are significantly lower than those reported here. Moreover, our 
dollar values are expressed in 2010 USD which is also different than the base year in Coles et al. (2006).
9 Data for the estimation of board and audit committee independence is available since 1999 in BoardEx.
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of the deals are financed only with cash with 19% being financed only with equity and the 
remaining 30% with a mixed method of financing.10
4.3  Univariate analysis of changes in acquisition risk
Table 3 presents differences in the change in firm risk surrounding the acquisition effective 
date between the pre- and post-SOX periods by selected incentive compensation measures. 
We classify firms with incentive compensation higher than the sample median for each 
variable as High Incentive firms (HI); otherwise, we classify them as Low Incentive firms 
(LI).11 Panels A and B examine the change in bidder risk for HI and LI acquirers respec-
tively. Panel B also presents tests of differences in stock return volatility before and after 
SOX between the HI and LI sub-samples. 
The findings are striking. Before SOX, HI firms make acquisition decisions that increase 
the volatility of their stock returns, consistent with the view that incentive pay makes 
acquiring managers less risk-averse (Datta et al. 2001). However, in the post-SOX period, 
the same firms make less risky acquisitions, and the drop from pre- to post-SOX is statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level across all measures of incentive compensation. Focusing 
on New_Grants, the value of − 0.157 in Panel B is significant at the 1% level and shows 
that the decrease in acquisition risk after SOX is significantly greater for higher incentiv-
ized managers relative to their lower incentivized counterparts.
These findings are robust to alternative incentive compensation measures. For instance, 
the average decrease in stock return volatility between pre- and post-SOX is 12.0% larger 
for HI bidders when Accum_Incentives is used as the compensation variable, (significant 
at the 1% level). Focusing on pay-risk sensitivity (Vega), the decrease in risk is again 
greater for HI firms by 10.7% with the difference being significant at the 5% level. On 
the other hand, we find no statistically significant change in risk when acquiring firms are 
grouped by the level of pay-performance sensitivity (Delta), which largely reflects manage-
rial incentives stemming from their stock holdings in the company (Core and Guay 2002; 
Coles et al. 2006). These results provide preliminary empirical support to our predictions 
that acquiring managers respond differently to equity incentives post-SOΧ with the impact 
on risk-taking being driven by their option portfolio.
4.4  Multivariate analysis of acquisition risk and incentive compensation
Table 4 extends our work to a multivariate setting. In addition to standard deal, firm, 
and governance variables, we control for confounding events, including the collapse of 
technology stocks in 2000/2001, the passage of SFAS No.123R in 2005/2006, and the 
global financial crisis in 2008. All multivariate models include industry fixed effects 
10 This pattern is similar to those provided by other studies (e.g. Loughran and Vijh 1997; Draper and 
Paudyal 2006; Bi and Gregory 2011; Croci and Petmezas 2015) subject to sample selection characteris-
tics. For instance, Bi and Gregory (2011) report that 48% of the large firms in their sample use cash as a 
method of financing. Our sample, due to the ExecuComp criterion, consists of mainly large firms. Croci and 
Petmezas (2015) who also use an ExecuComp-matched sample, show that 46% of the transactions in their 
sample are financed only with cash while 19% of the deals are financed only with equity.
11 Given the notable changes in compensation over the sample period documented in Table 1, we re-esti-
mate this analysis and classify observations as HI and LI according to annual values for incentive compen-
sation. The results are unchanged using this alternative classification.
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based on the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification approach. This controls 
for residual cross-sectional differences in costs of compliance with the Act and compen-
sation incentives (see Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2009; Leuz and Wysocki 2016).
Table 2  Summary statistics
The table presents summary statistics for the sample of 7747 acquisitions completed during the period Jan-
uary 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010. Data on executive compensation are from ExecuComp, stock price 
data from CRSP and accounting data from Compustat. Unless otherwise specified, all variables are meas-
ured at the end of the year preceding the acquisition announcement. Variable definitions are presented in 
Table 14




D_Risk 0.089 0.988  − 0.389 0.006 0.458 7747
D_Risk_AbR 0.144 1.096  − 0.378 0.052 0.580 7675
Compensation Vari-
ables
New_Grants 0.441 0.267 0.233 0.454 0.646 7747
New_OptionG 0.347 0.274 0.113 0.307 0.559 7747
New_StockG 0.094 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.138 7747
Unex_Options 0.025 0.030 0.007 0.017 0.034 7740
Unvest_Stock 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 7741
Accum_Incentives 0.027 0.031 0.008 0.018 0.036 7740
Delta ($000 s) 3115 26,498 211 602 1699 7490
Vega ($000 s) 442 943 46 130 402 7490
Cash_Comp 
($000 s)
4810 6703 2228 3374 5494 7747
Firm Character-
istics
Size 14.885 1.648 13.670 14.670 15.910 7747
Cash/Assets 0.155 0.179 0.026 0.076 0.225 7709
ROA 0.132 0.105 0.065 0.132 0.191 7742
Sales_Growth 0.065 0.123 0.005 0.045 0.106 7599
D_Leverage 0.015 0.091  − 0.021 0.000 0.039 7701
R&D 0.035 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.050 7747
Net_PPE 0.206 0.219 0.045 0.133 0.284 7672
CAPEX 0.046 0.058 0.010 0.030 0.060 7.672
Tenure 100 126 32 68 126 7148
Overconfidence 0.400 0.390 0.138 0.380 0.598 7005
Payment_Cash 0.514 0.500 0 1 1 7747
Payment_Stock 0.189 0.392 0 0 0 7747
CEO/Chairman 0.623 0.485 0 1 1 6685
Indep_Directors 0.825 0.0958 0.778 0.857 0.889 3915
Audit_Indep 0.935 0.1498 1.000 1.000 1.000 3928
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Table 3  Change in standard deviation of acquirer’s stock returns around the effective date
The table presents changes in the standard deviation of stock returns of the acquiring firms around the 
acquisition effective date. The sample is 7747 completed U.S. acquisitions over the period January 1, 1993, 
to December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. Acquisitions with an announcement date after July 30, 2002 
belong to the post-SOX period, otherwise they belong to the pre-SOX period. Data on executive compensa-
tion are from ExecuComp and stock price data from CRSP. Variable definitions are presented in Table 14. 
t-statistics are from the t-test of difference between means and z-statistics are from the Wilcoxon rank sum 
test for difference between the respective medians. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively
Compensation variable Pre-SOX Post-SOX Difference post 
vs pre
t/z Statistics
Panel A: high executive incentives
New_Grants
 Mean 0.177 0.024  − 0.153 − 4.30***
 Median 0.046  − 0.049  − 0.095  − 4.88***
 Observations 1948 1925
Accum_Incentives
 Mean 0.148 0.017  − 0.131  − 3.96***
 Median 0.034  − 0.041  − 0.074  − 3.81***
 Observations 2010 1871
Delta
 Mean 0.150 0.063  − 0.087  − 2.61***
 Median 0.055  − 0.028  − 0.083 − 3.66***
 Observations 1933 1812
Vega
 Mean 0.148 0.025  − 0.123  − 3.84***
 Median 0.043  − 0.040  − 0.082 − 4.35***
 Observations 1681 2064
Panel B: low executive incentives
New_Grants
 Mean 0.076 0.080 0.004 0.15
 Median 0.030  − 0.001  − 0.031  − 1.39
 Observations 2412 1462
 High VS low incentives − 0.157  − 3.45***
Accum_Incentives
 Mean 0.098 0.087  − 0.011 − 0.32
 Median 0.035  − 0.006  − 0.041 − 2.74***
 Observations 2350 1516
 High VS low incentives  − 0.120  − 2.65***
Delta
 Mean 0.098 0.028  − 0.070 − 2.12**
 Median 0.028  − 0.024  − 0.052 − 3.23***
 Observations 2357 1388
 High VS low incentives − 0.018  − 0.38
Vega
 Mean 0.104 0.089  − 0.016 − 0.41
 Median 0.032  − 0.001  − 0.033 − 1.84*
 Observations 2609 1136
 High VS low incentives  − 0.107  − 2.26**
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Table 4  Multivariate analysis of change in acquisition risk on new incentive grants
The table presents multivariate analysis of the change in risk of acquiring firms included in the sample of 
7747 acquisitions completed during the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. 
Variable definitions are presented in Table 14. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively
Variable D_Risk Model 1 D_Risk Model 2 D_Risk Model 3
Intercept  − 0.4354**  − 0.3778*  − 0.3187
(− 2.05) (− 1.77) (− 1.50)
New_Grants 0.2638***
(3.66)








New_StockG*SOX  − 0.1115
(− 0.67)
SOX  − 0.0114  − 0.0776**  − 0.2422***
(− 0.23) (− 1.97) (− 8.13)
Cash_Comp 0.0013 0.0018 0.0012
(0.50) (0.68) (0.46)
Internet_Crash  − 0.0319***  − 0.0312***  − 0.0252***
(− 3.88) (− 3.81) (− 3.18)
SFAS_123R 0.0588 0.0558 0.0723**
(1.64) (1.54) (2.00)
Financial_Crisis 0.1083*** 0.1044*** 0.1096***
(10.61) (10.12) (10.76)
Size 0.0411*** 0.0386*** 0.0405***
(4.30) (4.05) (4.38)
D_Leverage 0.4036*** 0.4008*** 0.3857***
(2.73) (2.71) (2.61)
Sales_Growth 0.2771** 0.2744** 0.3201**
(2.18) (2.14) (2.54)
Payment_Cash  − 0.1048***  − 0.1048***  − 0.1062***
(− 3.86) (− 3.85) (− 3.90)
Payment_Stock  − 0.0109  − 0.0087  − 0.0040
(− 0.26) (− 0.21) (− 0.10)
Tenure  − 0.0033  − 0.0033  − 0.0063
(− 0.35) (− 0.35) (− 0.66)
Overconfidence  − 0.0414  − 0.0387  − 0.0266
(− 1.28) (− 1.21) (− 0.87)
Number of observations 6434 6434 6434
F-statistic 6.09*** 9.89*** 6.08***
R-squared 0.078 0.077 0.073
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES
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Consistent with previous research findings (Datta et  al. 2001), Model 1 shows that 
incentive compensation in the pre-SOX period induces managers to make risk-increasing 
acquisitions. The coefficient of New_Grants is positive and significant at the 1% level. 
However, the interaction coefficient of New_Grants*SOX is significantly negative, show-
ing that the impact of new incentive grants on the riskiness of acquisition decisions has 
changed post-SOX. Managers appear to evaluate risk-taking incentives provided by equity-
related compensation in a more conservative way in the new regulatory environment. The 
results are also economically important indicating that the positive impact of new equity 
grants on risk-taking activity is more than offset by the effects of SOX. Before SOX, one 
standard deviation increase in New_Grants increases the standard deviation of stock returns 
by 7% following the completion of a deal, a 79% increase relative to the average D_Risk. 
However, post-SOX a similar increase in New_Grants is associated with a 7.4% decrease 
in the riskiness of corporate takeovers [i.e., 0.2665 × (0.2638–0.5412)], an 83% decrease 
relative to its mean.
We extend this analysis in Models 2 and 3 to differentiate between the impact of new 
stock options and restricted stock grants on risk-taking. Our descriptive statistics show an 
increased use of restricted stock grants in the post-SOX period. Theories of executive com-
pensation predict that a switch away from options will lead to a decline in risk-seeking 
behavior by firms (Nohel and Todd 2005; Coles et al. 2006). Consistent with Guay (1999) 
and Parrino et al. (2005), for the pre-SOX period the coefficient of New_OptionG is pos-
itive and significant at the 1% level, while New_StockG is unrelated to changes in risk. 
This reflects the convex payoff function inherent in executive stock options and confirms 
our prediction that the change in the way executives react to equity incentives post-SOX 
stems from their option portfolio. In accordance with this conjecture, our results confirm 
that almost the entire economic effect of equity grants on risk-taking is captured by stock 
options. Before SOX, one standard deviation increase in new option grants (New_OptionG) 
increases D_Risk by 6.9% (a 77% increase relative to its mean) while post-SOX a similar 
increase in New_OptionG reduces D_Risk by 6.2% (a 70% increase relative to its mean).
The signs of the control variables are as expected. Risk taking decreases post-SOX 
(Bargeron et al. 2010) and we observe a higher post-acquisition volatility of stock returns 
for poor performing acquirers that initiated corporate takeovers during the financial crisis. 
Large firms have a higher capacity for risk taking which is also positively related to sales 
growth (Guay 1999). By definition, the volatility of stock returns increases with leverage 
while the use of cash as payment method is associated with lower uncertainty regarding the 
quality of the deal (Officer 2007).
4.4.1  Sensitivity analysis: corporate governance
In this section, we extend our baseline OLS results to examine the robustness of our find-
ings to inclusion of corporate governance characteristics. Linck et  al. (2009) show an 
increase in board independence following the introduction of SOX. The Act simultane-
ously increased demand for independent directors by mandating greater use while at the 
same time reducing their supply by increasing workload and making independent directors 
subject to greater personal liabilities. Coles et al. (2014) note similar findings for their sam-
ple of co-opted directors. Dicks (2012) posits that corporate governance is a substitute for 
incentive compensation, while Jiménez-Angueira and Stuart (2015) find that effective cor-
porate governance systems lead firms to set incentive compensation optimally with respect 
to firm performance.
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Therefore, a concern with our baseline findings is that M&A decisions are not solely 
driven by compensation incentives, and any changes in the quality of governance following 
the SOX may contaminate our results. Under this explanation, the weak post-SOX remu-
neration incentives—risk-taking relationship may be the result of board characteristics that 
hamper managerial risk-taking and are omitted from the analysis. In other words, it is not 
that managers became less responsive to incentives, but they are stopped from taking par-
ticular forms of risk by active board monitoring.
To address this concern, we re-estimate our baseline results including controls for board 
governance and their interaction with SOX. We include the proportion of independent 
directors on the board, Indep_Directors, the proportion of independent directors on the 
audit committee, Audit_Indep, the dummy variable CEO/Chairman to control for CEO 
duality and our measure for CEO Overconfidence. We include interactions of all these gov-
ernance measures with the SOX dummy to control for their impact on risk-taking following 
the passage of the Act. If the negative relation between option-based incentives and risk-
taking post-SOX documented in our earlier tests is driven by the impact of other govern-
ance factors, the inclusion of these variables in the analysis should remove the significant 
compensation effect in our baseline findings.
We present these results in Table 5. Board independence appears to reduce risk-taking 
before SOX (significant at the 10% level in Models 1 and 2) but it does not have a mate-
rial impact post-SOX. Surprisingly, audit committee independence is positively associated 
with risk-taking post SOX, but controlling for this relation does not affect our baseline 
findings. Furthermore, CEO overconfidence does not appear to explain the shift in risk-
taking activity post-SOX.
Including these variables does not affect the impact of incentive compensation on post-
acquisition changes in firm risk surrounding SOX. Both the interaction of New_Grants 
(Model 1) and New_OptionsG (Model 2) with SOX remain negative and retain their sta-
tistical significance at the 1% level. Our results suggest that changes in board independ-
ence and CEO overconfidence surrounding the passage of the Act do not affect the relation 
between executive compensation and managerial incentives to undertake risky corporate 
investments. Because governance data from BoardEx is available only for a sub-set of our 
main sample resulting in a substantial drop in observations12 we exclude these governance 
controls from the remainder of our analysis.13
12 Governance data is available in BoardEx only since 1999.
13 Inclusion of these additional controls for board governance (CEO/Chairman, Indep_Directors and 
Audit_Indep) does not affect the results presented subsequently in this paper when we use alternative incen-
tive compensation measures. Results are available in Online Appendix Table  5c. We also use the gov-
ernance index (GIM index) of Gompers et  al. (2003) to capture changes in corporate governance quality 
between the pre- and post-SOX period that could have affected our results. The use of a broader governance 
index further controls for a potential correlation between the various corporate governance proxies used 
earlier in the analysis. Our results remain unchanged and are available in Tables 5e and 6e of the Online 
Appendix. In further robustness checks, we supplement the GIM index with director ownership, since Bha-
gat and Bolton (2008) show that a composite measure of corporate governance combining both GIM index 
and director ownership is a more powerful predictor of operating performance than either measure by itself. 
Our results remain unchanged and are available in Tables 5f and 6f of the Online Appendix. In final tests, 
we construct an internal governance index which we incorporate into the analysis along with the GIM index 
to capture more effectively the impact of both external and internal governance factors surrounding the pas-
sage of SOX. Our results remain unaffected, are available in Tables 5g and 6g of the Online Appendix and 
are robust to controls for endogeneity [following Bebchuk et al. (2009) and using five-year lagged internal 
governance index data. Online Appendix tables: 5 h–6i].
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4.4.2  Sensitivity analysis: accumulated incentive compensation
Restricting our analysis to new stock and option grants may not be representative of mana-
gerial incentives at the point in time when investment decisions are made. Accumulated 
incentives can be equally important given that newly granted incentives cannot be exer-
cised immediately. Table 6 repeats the analysis by looking at the impact of accumulated 
incentives on changes in firm risk surrounding acquisitions.
In Model 1 the coefficient of Accum_Incentives is positive and significant at the 1% 
level confirming that equity incentives granted in previous years have an important impact 
on managerial behavior before SOX. However, similar to our findings about new equity 
grants, the interaction coefficient of Accum_Incentives*SOX is negative and significant 
at the 1% level, revealing an important weakening in the positive effect that accumulated 
incentives have on acquisition risk post-SOX.
Models 2 and 3 separate accumulated incentives into unexercised options and unvested 
stock respectively. Confirming our earlier analysis, the results show that stock options miti-
gate managerial risk-aversion more effectively than restricted stock before SOX. The coeffi-
cient of Unex_Options is positive and significant at the 1% level while that of Unvest_Stock 
is positive but statistically insignificant. Models 2 and 3 also confirm that the weakening 
in the relation between equity incentives and risk-taking post-SOX is driven by the execu-
tives’ option portfolio. The coefficient of Unex_Options*SOX is negative and significant at 
the 1% level while that of Unvest_Stock*SOX is statistically insignificant. Economically, 
the impact of accumulated incentives on risk-taking is important but less than the impact of 
new equity grants. For instance, one standard deviation increase in Unex_Options increases 
D_Risk by 8.4% before SOX but only by 0.4% post-SOX showing an important weakening 
in the relationship between option grants and risk-taking. However, Model 2 in Table 4 
shows that a one standard deviation increase in new option grants post-SOX reduces D_
Risk by 6.2%, changing the way managers respond to equity incentives.
In Models 4 and 5, we extend our analysis of accumulated incentives to examine the 
role of pay-performance (Delta) and pay-risk (Vega) sensitivity14 on risk taking. Coles 
et al. (2006) show that while Vega is associated with riskier investments and higher stock 
return volatility, the impact of Delta on firm risk is not so clear. A higher Delta increases 
the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to changes in firm value and can lead either to risk-
ier investments (John and John 1993) or increased risk aversion (Guay 1999). Model 4 
shows that Delta cannot explain post-acquisition changes in firm risk. In contrast, Model 5 
shows that the change in the way managers perceive risk-taking incentives post-SOΧ can 
be captured by the pay-risk sensitivity of their option portfolio. Before SOX, an increase 
by one standard deviation in Vega increases D_Risk by 4% but post-SOX a similar increase 
in Vega decreases D_Risk by 1%. The difference is statistically significant at the 10% level 
and economically important too as it represents a change of 57% relative to the mean of the 
dependent variable.
14 In line with previous studies (i.e. Coles et al. 2006), Delta and Vega are entered in millions of dollars in 
the multivariate regressions.
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Table 5  Change in acquisition risk on new incentive grants with additional controls for corporate govern-
ance
Variable D_Risk Model 1 D_Risk Model 2 D_Risk Model 3
Intercept  − 0.1030 0.0342 0.1042
(− 0.22) (0.07) (0.23)
New_Grants 0.3120*
(1.79)








New_StockG*SOX  − 0.2179
(− 0.64)
SOX  − 1.2085***  − 1.2748***  − 1.4684***
(− 2.70) (− 2.86) (− 3.34)
Cash_Comp  − 0.0002 0.0004 0.0001
(− 0.07) (0.14) (0.03)
Internet_Crash  − 0.0431***  − 0.0420***  − 0.0366***
(− 3.31) (− 3.26) (− 2.90)
SFAS_123R 0.0394 0.0415 0.0532
(1.01) (1.05) (1.36)
Financial_Crisis 0.1000*** 0.0974*** 0.1027***
(8.95) (8.58) (9.21)
Size 0.0537*** 0.0473*** 0.0462***
(4.03) (3.55) (3.59)
D_Leverage 0.3537 0.3530 0.3230
(1.63) (1.63) (1.49)
Sales_Growth 0.2749 0.2691 0.2710
(1.42) (1.39) (1.42)
Payment_Cash  − 0.0403  − 0.0409  − 0.0417
(− 1.06) (− 1.07) (− 1.09)
Payment_Stock 0.0279 0.0364 0.0434
(0.33) (0.44) (0.52)
Tenure  − 0.0276  − 0.0267  − 0.0267
(− 1.53) (− 1.47) (− 1.46)
CEO/Chairman  − 0.0240  − 0.0283  − 0.0585
(− 0.30) (− 0.36) (− 0.74)
CEO/Chairman*SOX 0.0743 0.0768 0.1123
(0.84) (0.87) (1.28)
Indep_Directors  − 0.6935*  − 0.6805*  − 0.5952
(− 1.94) (− 1.90) (− 1.64)
Indep_Directors*SOX 0.4339 0.3904 0.3597
(1.05) (0.94) (0.86)
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4.5  Summary
Executive compensation plays an important role in mitigating managerial risk aversion in 
the pre-SOX period, which stems from the convex nature of payoffs from executive stock 
options. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism in inducing risk-taking is signifi-
cantly weaker post-SOX. Now, acquiring managers appear less responsive to the same risk-
taking incentives and perceive significantly different incentives provided by new equity 
grants. The change in the relation between equity incentives and risk-taking is driven by 
the executives’ option portfolio. On the other hand, the properties of restricted stock grants, 
which are more closely related to the compensation characteristics captured by Delta, can-
not explain changes in acquisition risk surrounding the passage of SOX.
5  Robustness testing
5.1  Endogeneity tests
Our analysis so far shows that acquiring managers have changed the way they perceive risk-
taking incentives post-SOX and this has led to the decreased levels of risk-taking observed 
in this period. However, both the decision to make risky investments and the structure of 
managerial compensation are likely to be endogenously determined. In other words, man-
agers may become more risk-averse if they are provided with less risk-taking incentives but 
at the same time firms may adjust the structure of compensation contracts to achieve the 
desired level of risk-taking. Post-SOX, firms have reduced risk-taking incentives in order to 
control their risk-exposure (Cohen et al. 2013).
In our earlier tests, we use lagged compensation variables to avoid the impact of acqui-
sition decisions on equity incentives. Additionally, given that we use the passage of SOX 
as an exogenous shock to test changes in the way managers perceive risk-taking incentives, 
The table presents multivariate analysis of the change in risk of acquiring firms included in the sample of 
7747 acquisitions completed during the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. 
Variable definitions are presented in Table 14. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively
Table 5  (continued)
Variable D_Risk Model 1 D_Risk Model 2 D_Risk Model 3
Audit_Indep  − 0.2320  − 0.2393  − 0.2350
(− 1.28) (− 1.32) (− 1.29)
Audit_Indep*SOX 0.8814*** 0.8793*** 0.9297***
(3.21) (3.21) (3.35)
Overconfidence  − 0.0879  − 0.0881  − 0.0587
(− 0.94) (− 0.94) (− 0.70)
Overconfidence*SOX 0.0629 0.0707 0.0211
(0.48) (0.54) (0.17)
Number of observations 3277 3277 3277
F-statistic 4.84*** 3.80*** 3.75***
R-squared 0.111 0.109 0.107
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES
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Table 6  Multivariate analysis of change in acquisition risk on accumulated incentives
Variable D_Risk Model 1 D_Risk Model 2 D_Risk Model 3 D_Risk Model 4 D_Risk Model 5
Intercept  − 0.5164**  − 0.5251**  − 0.2956  − 0.3268  − 0.3176























Vega*SOX  − 0.0541*
(− 1.66)
SOX  − 0.1784***  − 0.1843***  − 0.2408***  − 0.2590***  − 0.2414***
(− 5.19) (− 5.39) (− 8.75) (− 9.56) (− 8.32)
Cash_Comp_Top5 0.0004 0.0004 0.0013 0.0014 0.0013
(0.13) (0.14) (0.48) (0.51) (0.48)
Internet_Crash  − 0.0260***  − 0.0262***  − 0.0249***  − 0.0254***  − 0.0273***
(− 3.30) (− 3.33) (− 3.15) (− 3.18) (− 3.35)
SFAS_123R 0.0685* 0.0692* 0.0714** 0.0746** 0.0765**
(1.90) (1.92) (1.98) (1.98) (2.03)
Financial_Crisis 0.1086*** 0.1087*** 0.1095*** 0.1102*** 0.1101***
(10.70) (10.70) (10.72) (10.40) (10.39)
Size 0.0498*** 0.0505*** 0.0392*** 0.0418*** 0.0407***
(4.91) (4.99) (4.21) (4.29) (3.92)
D_Leverage 0.4332*** 0.4320*** 0.3945*** 0.3622** 0.3634**
(2.93) (2.92) (2.67) (2.44) (2.45)
Sales_Growth 0.2736** 0.2755** 0.3203** 0.3211** 0.3274**
(2.17) (2.18) (2.57) (2.48) (2.53)
Payment_Cash  − 0.1048***  − 0.1046***  − 0.1057***  − 0.1073***  − 0.1074***
(− 3.85) (− 3.84) (− 3.88) (− 3.89) (− 3.90)
Payment_Stock  − 0.0020  − 0.0022  − 0.0024  − 0.0043  − 0.0050
(− 0.05) (− 0.05) (− 0.06) (− 0.10) (− 0.12)
Tenure  − 0.0063  − 0.0066  − 0.0064  − 0.0055  − 0.0053
(− 0.66) (− 0.69) (− 0.67) (− 0.58) (− 0.55)
Overconfidence  − 0.0371  − 0.0381  − 0.0255  − 0.0322  − 0.0352
(− 1.12) (− 1.15) (− 0.84) (− 1.00) (− 1.06)
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we expect that our results are not driven by reverse causality.15 However, it is possible that 
compensation committees changed risk-taking incentives in anticipation of the stricter gov-
ernance code brought by the passage of SOX. Therefore, in this section we perform some 
further testing to confirm that our findings are robust to endogeneity concerns.
5.1.1  Changes in the propensity to undertake risky investments post‑SOX
It is possible that managers are less inclined to undertake risky investments post-SOX due 
to the personal costs of undertaking value-destroying projects in this period (Shadab 2008; 
Bargeron et al. 2010; Arping and Sautner 2013). If so, this creates a problem of selection 
bias in our earlier findings. To address this concern, we estimate acquisition probability for 
the full panel of ExecuComp firm-years from probit models estimated using the explana-
tory variables outlined in Harford (1999), which we supplement with incentive compensa-
tion and the SOX dummy variable. We also add Overconfidence as an explanatory variable 
to control for the fact that SOX may affect the decision to acquire by restraining CEO con-
fidence (Banerjee et al. 2015). The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a firm 
undertakes an acquisition during the financial year, and zero otherwise.
Table 15 present the results of the probit models. Our results confirm that risk-taking 
incentives stemming from executives’ equity and option portfolio can induce acquisition 
activity (Boulton et al. 2014; Croci and Petmezas 2015). In particular, Models 1–4 show 
that both new and accumulated incentives are positively related to the propensity to acquire 
while Model 5 provides support to the findings of Croci and Petmezas (2015) that it is 
the pay-risk sensitivity (Vega) that makes executives more acquisitive. With regard to the 
control variables, we find a positive relation between acquisition probability and firm size, 
cash ratio, and revenue growth (Harford 1999). On the other hand, the probability of acqui-
sition decreases with book-to-market ratio and leverage (Uysal 2011). The Overconfidence 
variable is positive and significant at the one percent level in all models confirming that 
overconfident CEOs have a higher propensity to acquire (Malmendier and Tate 2008; Bil-
lett and Qian 2008). Once we control for executive compensation and CEO overconfidence, 
The table presents multivariate analysis of the change in risk of acquiring firms included in the sample of 
7747 acquisitions completed during the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. 
Variable definitions are presented in Table 14. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively
Table 6  (continued)
Variable D_Risk Model 1 D_Risk Model 2 D_Risk Model 3 D_Risk Model 4 D_Risk Model 5
Number of observa-
tions
6431 6431 6432 6265 6265
F-statistic 5.52*** 5.53*** 6.09*** 5.63*** 7.23***
R-squared 0.076 0.076 0.074 0.074 0.074
Industry fixed 
effects
YES YES YES YES YES
15 Similar arguments are made elsewhere in the literature when SOX is used as an exogenous shock (see, 
for instance; Guo et al. 2015; Banerjee et al. 2018; Hege et al. 2021).
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SOX does not have an important impact on acquisitiveness, consistent with the findings of 
Banerjee et al. (2015).
From these models, we predict the likelihood of undertaking an acquisition for each 
firm-year observation in our main sample. We label this variable Acq_Prob. If SOX 
reduces the probability of undertaking acquisitions via changes in managerial incentives, 
this endogenously determined control variable should reduce concerns surrounding selec-
tion bias in our acquisition sample. Sample size is reduced to 5631 observations in this test 
due to data requirements for the estimation of Acq_Prob.
We present the results in Table 7 and confirm that our findings hold across all option-
based incentive measures Specifically, we find that post-acquisition changes in firm risk are 
positively related to new stock option grants (Models 1 and 2), accumulated unexercised 
options (Model 4 and 5) and Vega (Model 7) before SOX, but the relation between these 
compensation incentives and acquisition risk changes significantly post-SOX. We do not 
find any statistically significant relation between stock grants and risk-taking surrounding 
the passage of SOX (Model 3 and 6).
5.1.2  System of simultaneous equations
In this section we perform additional testing to rule out the possibility that the simultane-
ous determination of managerial incentives and risk-taking affects our results. Following 
Rogers (2002) and Coles et al. (2006), we use a three-stage-least-squares (3SLS) system of 
simultaneous equations to estimate the determinants of contemporaneous incentive com-
pensation and changes in post-acquisition firm risk (D_Risk). Our incentive compensa-
tion measures, New_OptionGc,16 New_StockGc, Unex_Optionsc, Unvest_Stockc, Deltac and 
Vegac and the change in acquisition risk (D_Risk) are endogenous variables in the three-
stage-least-squares (3SLS) model. The independent variables used to explain changes in 
firm risk surrounding acquisition decisions are the same as in the preceding analysis. Con-
trol variables for managerial incentives are in line with prior literature on executive com-
pensation and corporate investments (see Coles et al. 2006; Croci and Petmezas 2015).
Table 8 presents the results. In line with our earlier findings, we document a positive 
relation between equity incentives and acquisition risk, which becomes weaker after the 
passage of SOX. Panel A presents the results for new incentive grants, Panel B for accumu-
lated incentives and Panel C for Delta and Vega. In all three Panels, the option-based incen-
tives are positively related to risk-taking before SOX but this relation shows a significant 
weakening after the passage of the Act. The coefficients of New_OptionGc, Unex_Optionsc 
and Vegac are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level while their interactions 
with SOX are negative and significant also at the 1 present level.
Furthermore, the results confirm our conjecture that the observed risk aversion of man-
agers post-SOX stems from their option portfolio. For instance, Panel B shows that the 
pre-SOX positive impact of incentive compensation on risk-taking is pronounced on unex-
ercised options. Post-SOX however, an increase in executives’ holdings of unexercised 
options leads to a decrease in the riskiness of acquisition decisions. On the other hand, the 
coefficient on unvested stock is significant only at the 10% level and its interaction with 
SOX indicates a positive switch towards risk-taking which cannot explain the observed 
decrease in acquisition risk post-SOX. Similarly, Panel C shows a positive relation between 
16 The superscript symbol “c” denotes contemporaneous values.
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Vega and acquisition risk before SOX but this relation weakens significantly post-SOX 
with the coefficient of Vega*SOX being negative and significant at the 1% level. In line 
with our earlier results, we find no relation between Delta and changes in firm risk sur-
rounding acquisitions. Overall, these results confirm our core finding that SOX weakened 
the positive relation between option-based incentives and risk-taking activity.
5.1.3  Predicted incentives and propensity score matching
To alleviate remaining concerns that our results reflect a spurious relation between equity 
incentives and risk-taking, we conduct two additional endogeneity tests in this section. The 
first test uses optimal levels of endogenously predicted equity incentives to test their impact 
on risk-taking surrounding the passage of SOX. We follow Core and Guay (1999) to pre-
dict managerial incentives, based on a number of firm characteristics, and we use these 
predicted values as instruments of equity-based compensation to re-examine our findings. 
In addition, we control for the impact of market wide movements on investment risk using 
a propensity score matched abnormal returns-based risk measure (D_Risk_PSM).
Panel A in Table  9 presents the results. The interaction term of Pred_New_Grants 
and SOX in Model 1 is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level showing 
that new equity grants awarded after the passage of SOX adversely affect risk-taking 
activity. Models 2 and 3 confirm that the change in the relation between equity incen-
tives and risk taking stems from the executives’ option portfolio with the coefficient of 
Pred_New_OptionG*SOX being negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. On 
the other hand, the coefficient of Pred_New_StockG*SOX in Model 3 is not significant 
at conventional levels. Models 4–6 show that predicted changes in both pay-performance 
(Pred_Delta) and pay-risk (Pred_Vega) sensitivity can explain the reduced risk-taking 
activity post-SOX. However, the impact of Vega remains economically more impor-
tant. Model 6, where we control for both Delta and Vega, shows that post-SOX one 
standard deviation increase in Pred_Delta leads to a 5% decrease in D_Risk_AbR, [i.e., 
1.494 × (0.0048–0.0391)] which is a 35% change relative to its mean. At the same time, 
one standard deviation increase in Pred_Vega is associated with an 8% decrease in D_
Risk_AbR, [i.e., 0.269 × (− 0.0045–0.2928)] representing a 56% change relative to its mean.
Our measures of post-acquisition changes in firm risk may also suffer from a selection 
bias if acquiring firms are materially different to non-acquiring firms. To address this con-
cern, we construct a propensity score matched measure of abnormal stock price volatility. 
D_Risk_PSM is defined as the volatility of acquirer’s excess stock returns for a 6-month 
period following the effective date (+ 60 to + 185 trading days) minus the volatility of 
acquirer’s excess stock returns for a 6-month period preceding the announcement date 
(− 185 to − 60 trading days). Excess returns are calculated as the bidder’s daily returns 
minus those of the propensity-score matched firm for the same period. Similar to our D_
Risk_AbR measure, the event period stops 60 trading days before the announcement date 
and starts again 60 trading days after the effective date to avoid the impact of acquisition 
negotiation and completion periods on our results (Kravet 2014). Propensity scores are 
estimated using Harford’s (1999) model to predict bidders. The model is estimated sepa-
rately for each year during our sample period and each acquirer is matched to the firm 
with the closest propensity score in the same industry-year that has not been involved in 
any M&A activity for a period of three years surrounding the acquisition effective date. 
Matched firms that are delisted before the completion of 185 trading days following the 
acquisition are replaced with the next closest match on the delisting date.
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Panel B in Table 9 presents the results. Since we now control for selection bias in our 
dependent variable through propensity score matching, we use actual rather than predicted 
incentives as our main explanatory variables. The results confirm our main findings. Model 
1 shows that new equity grants are positively associated with risk-taking before SOX but 
this relation is significantly weakened post-SOX with the coefficients of both New_Grants 
and New_Grants*SOX being statistically significant at the 1% level. Disentangling the 
components of new equity grants to new option grants and new restricted stock grants 
in Models 2 and 3 respectively confirms that the effect is driven by the option portfolios 
of executives. New_OptionG is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level while 
New_OptionsG*SOX is negative and statistically significant at the same level. In contrast, 
New_StockG is not significantly associated with risk-taking either before or after SOX. To 
maintain consistency with Panel A, Models 4–6 examine the impact of changes in pay-
performance and pay-risk sensitivity on risk taking. Pay-performance sensitivity (Delta), 
that reflects executives’ stock portfolio, does not have an important impact on risk-taking in 
Models 4 and 6. On the other hand, Pay-risk sensitivity (Vega), which stems from execu-
tives’ option portfolio, shows a significant positive association with risk-taking before SOX 
but this relation shows a significant weakening post-SOX.
5.1.4  Changes in risk‑taking incentives
As a final check to ensure that our results are not driven by changes in managerial com-
pensation due to the M&A transaction, we partition our sample into two sub-samples. The 
first sub-sample includes those acquiring firms that increase risk-taking incentives from the 
end of the year preceding the acquisition announcement (t − 1) to the end of the year fol-
lowing the completion of the deal (t + 1) with the second sub-sample including those firms 
that reduce risk-taking incentives for the same period. If our results are driven by under-
lying changes in managerial compensation, we should observe the risk-taking reduction 
post-SOX only for the sub-sample of firms that reduce risk-taking incentives. However, 
repeating our analysis only for the sub-sample of firms that increased risk-taking incen-
tives leaves our results unchanged. Our sub-sample results confirm that risk-taking incen-
tives are positively related to risk-taking activity before SOX but their interaction with 
SOX becomes negative and statistically significant even if firms have increased risk-taking 
incentives in the same period.17 The sub-sample analysis also confirms that the change in 
the way managers respond to risk-taking incentives stems from their option portfolio in line 
with our earlier results.
Collectively, the results of the sub-sample analysis along with all endogeneity tests pre-
sented in Sect. 5.1. confirm that our findings are robust to a number of alterative tests to 
assess causality and provide supportive evidence that our results are not driven by under-
lying changes in managerial compensation. Managers respond differently to risk-taking 
incentives post-SOX with the increased managerial risk-aversion being evident even for 
those managers that receive higher risk-taking incentives in the same period.
17 The results are available in Tables 4d and 6d of our Online Appendix.
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5.2  Alternative acquisition risk measures
In addition to the risk measures presented in Table 9, D_Risk_AbR and D_Risk_PSM, in 
this section we examine the cross-sectional dispersion of post-acquisition stock returns as 
an alternative measure of acquisition risk. Following Yung et al. (2008) we propose that 
uncertainty will lead to greater variation in the quality of acquisition decisions resulting 
in a higher dispersion of post-acquisition stock returns. Therefore, we expect the adverse 
impact of SOX on risk-taking to be reflected in a reduction in the dispersion of post-acqui-
sition performance following the implementation of the Act. Following our prior results, 
we expect this effect to be most pronounced in the group of highly incentivized managers.
We calculate the cross-sectional standard deviation of acquirer daily cumulative abnor-
mal returns (CARs) for four different time intervals beginning one day following the 
announcement date: 3, 6, 9 and 12 months. We calculate CARs using a daily market model 
where the market return is drawn from the CRSP value-weighted index and an estimation 
period from 200 to 60 days before the announcement.18
We present these findings in Table 10. Panels A and B report our findings for the pre-
SOX and post-SOX periods respectively, and panel C examines differences in post-acqui-
sition return dispersion between the post- and pre-SOX periods for high and low incentiv-
ized managers. Consistent with our predictions, we find that pre-SOX, high Delta and Vega 
encourage managers to take on more risky acquisitions, which results in greater dispersion 
of post-acquisition outcomes in comparison to low incentivized managers. Focusing on 
Vega for instance, the standard deviation of post-acquisition 12-month CARs is 0.404 for 
high incentivized managers, which is greater than the figure of 0.383 for low Vega manag-
ers and the difference is significant at the 5% level. However, the effect reverses post-SOX, 
such that high-incentivized managers make less risky acquisitions based on the dispersion 
of post-acquisition returns. For 12-month CARs, the cross-sectional standard deviation of 
post-acquisition returns for high Vega managers is 0.266, which is significantly lower than 
the corresponding figure of 0.340 for low Vega managers.
In Panel C, we report differences in standard deviation of post-deal returns between post-
SOX and pre-SOX periods. 15 out of 16 differences between pre- and post-SOX acquisi-
tions in Panel C are significant providing strong evidence that acquisition risk declined 
after the passage of SOX. Notably, the economic size of the risk decline is approximately 
three times larger for high-incentivized managers relative to their low incentivized counter-
parts, confirming that SOX has significantly affected the way managers perceive compen-
sation contracts that are notionally set-up to encourage risk seeking investment decisions. 
Collectively, the results in Tables 9 and 10 confirm that our main findings are robust to the 
definition of risk and test design to examine changes in firm risk surrounding corporate 
acquisitions.19
18 Our results are unchanged if we measure abnormal returns starting from one day after the effective, 
rather than the announcement, date and if we examine abnormal buy-and-hold returns benchmarked against 
an industry, size, and book-to-market matched control firm. They are also unchanged if we define high and 
low compensation firms separately within the pre-SOX and post-SOX groups, rather than for the full sam-
ple of firms.
19 Related to the changing financing of mergers, we also consider if the propensity to de-leverage business 
risk through asset divestitures following mergers has changed surrounding SOX. We collect data on asset 
divestitures from SDC Platinum following the identification process outlined in Borisova et al. (2013) and 
where the bidder has either announced or completed a divestiture in the 6-month post-merger period from 
the effective date. This results in 964 observations. 582 of the divestitures in our sample occurred in the 
pre-SOX period and 382 take place post-SOX, suggesting no obvious increase in the propensity to divest 
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5.3  Timeliness of SOX
Following prior research, we treat the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act as a clean event 
(Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2009; Dicks 2012; Cohen et al. 2013) and identify pre- and 
post-SOX mergers as those occurring before and after July 30, 2002. Although the period 
leading up to SOX began with the dotcom collapse in 2000, Wintoki (2007) identifies the 
formal and value relevant information from the proposals, development and enactment of 
SOX as being released over a relatively short period between January 15 and August 15, 
2002. Nejadmalayeri et al. (2013) describe the passage of the Act as having been passed in 
record time in comparison to legislation of comparable scope.
Nonetheless, Leuz and Wysocki (2016) highlight a number of potentially confounding 
events that led to SOX, which potentially weaken our ability to draw causal inference from 
the Act to management compensation incentives to undertake risky investment decisions. 
We aim to address the issue in base testing with controls for the internet crash of 2001, the 
introduction of SFAS No. 123R, and the global financial crisis of 2007–2008.
To examine the robustness of our assumption regarding the speed of SOX and its impact 
on how managers respond to compensation incentives, we follow the approach of Nejad-
malayeri et al. (2013) who introduce a series of annual post-SOX dummy variables to ver-
ify if the SOX effect occurs in each year. The dummies are labelled SOXyear for the years 
2002b, 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively to reflect the specified calendar years and the 
period August 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002 following the passage of the Act. We report 
these results in Table 11.
Supporting our interpretation that SOX has an immediate effect, we find that the inter-
action between SOX2002b and incentive compensation is negative and significant at the 1% 
level, highlighting the structural change in the relation between equity incentives and risk-
taking. The negative interaction terms are also significant for the years 2003 and 2004 and 
confirm the effect is long-lasting. Our findings support the view that SOX had an immedi-
ate and permanent impact on corporate behavior.20
20 In further testing, we repeat the analysis dropping the years 1999–2001 to remove the dotcom period 
and 2007–2010 to remove the financial crisis period and any associated bias caused by their inclusion. Our 
results continue to hold. We also redefine the period covered by our SOX dummy over shorter windows 
from August 2002 to December 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. Our results continue to hold for these 
alternative windows.
risky assets during the post-SOX period. The risk-reduction we observe post-SOX is concentrated in non-
divesting firms rather than divesting firms. Therefore, our main results are not driven by firms taking on 
excessive risk during both periods but being more willing to divest this during the post-SOX period. We 
also consider whether changes in risk post-acquisition are driven by simultaneous changes in the method 
of payment or firm leverage surrounding SOX. We find that post-SOX there is a decline in propensity to 
undertake entirely stock financed acquisitions and a simultaneous increase in the frequency of all-cash 
deals, but we find no evidence that post-acquisition changes in leverage vary surrounding SOX. To examine 
whether the change in method of payment affects our earlier results, we re-estimate the main regression in 
Table 4 with additional controls for the interaction of D_Leverage, Payment_Cash, and Payment_Stock with 
the SOX dummy. The interaction terms are insignificant in all models and their inclusion does not affect the 
relation between incentive compensation, SOX and post-acquisition changes in risk.
Footnote 19 (continued)
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6  Impact of SOX on post‑acquisition performance
Our findings so far show that SOX leads to a reduction in the incentive for corporate man-
agers to undertake risky acquisition investments, which stems from executives’ option port-
folio. Research on merger activity shows that risky transactions can be value destroying 
over the long-term for acquiring firm shareholders (Moeller et al. 2005; Bouwman et al. 
2009). If this is the case, then our results support the argument that firms and managers 
responded to SOX in a value-enhancing manner. Alternatively, corporate boards encour-
age managers to undertake value enhancing corporate investments, including some risky 
acquisitions, and therefore our findings could actually be an unwelcome development for 
firm shareholders. We examine the role of risk-taking incentives in the quality of merger in 
this section.
We study the wealth effects of SOX on acquiring firms using four performance meas-
ures. We measure long-run stock-price performance by 2yrABHR, which is the 2-year daily 
buy-and-hold return of the acquiring firm beginning one day following the acquisition 
effective date minus the return of a matched firm over the same period. We select matched 
firms by industry, year, size and book-to-market ratio from a universe of firms that have not 
been involved in any acquisition activity for a period of 3 years surrounding the deal effec-
tive date.21 Following Bradley et al. (1988) and Golubov et al. (2012), we capture the total 
dollar gains for the bidder and the target from the transaction by the variable Synergies 
defined as the as the market value of equity 6 trading days before the acquisition announce-
ment date times the cumulated abnormal returns over an 11-day window surrounding the 
announcement date (− 5, + 5) for each firm.22 Cumulated abnormal returns are based on the 
market model using the CRSP value-weighted index. D_TFP measures the change in total 
factor productivity (TFP) from the end of the year preceding the acquisition announcement 
to the end of the year following the completion of the deal. Firm-year TFP data is from 
İmrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014) and estimations are based on the semiparametric procedure 
suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) that controls for selection and simultaneity bias.23 We 
gauge changes in operating performance by D_ROA, defined as the difference in the return 
on assets (ROA) of the acquiring firm from the end of the year preceding the acquisition 
announcement to the end of the year following the completion of the deal.
Table  12 presents univariate results of the impact of SOX on the deal performance 
measures discussed above. We observe a general negative effect of the Act on the perfor-
mance of acquiring firms. Before SOX, acquiring shareholders experience a positive and 
significant mean (median) 2yrABHR of 5.54% (2.71%) while post-SOX 2yrABHR is not 
statistically different than zero. The mean (median) 2yrABHR decreases by 6.40% (3.25%) 
between the pre and post-SOX period and the difference is significant at the 1% level. 
In addition, merged firms experience lower synergy gains post SOX but the difference 
is not significant at conventional levels. The passage of SOX has also a negative impact 
on median TFP and the difference is significant at the 10% level. On the other hand, we 
21 These matching criteria are consistent with those used in previous relevant studies (Barber and Lyon 
1997; Spiess and Affleck-Graves 1999; Datta et al. 2001; Harford and Li 2007; Billett et al. 2010; Duchin 
and Schmidt 2013).
22 We exclude the value of the target shares held by the acquirer before the transaction from the estimation 
of target’s synergy gains.
23 We are grateful to İmrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014) for making their data publicly available.
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observe a small improvement in operating performance (ROA) but the change between the 
pre and post-SOX period is not significant.
Weaker acquisition performance in the post-SOX period may be due to a broader reduc-
tion in the set of profitable investment opportunities under the new regulatory environment 
rather than stemming from an adverse impact of SOX on the efficiency of incentive con-
tracts to induce value-enhancing decisions. Therefore, we extend our analysis to a multi-
variate setting in Table 13 to test the role of risk-taking incentives in these effects and con-
trol for a number of factors that previous studies have identified as important determinants 
of deal performance (Travlos 1987; Jensen 1988; Morck et al. 1990; Harford 1999; Shleifer 
and Vishny 2003; Moeller et al. 2004; Officer 2007; Golubov et al. 2012).
We find a positive or neutral impact of risk-taking incentives on deal performance post-
SOX. More specifically, we find a positive impact of incentive pay on those performance 
measures that have experienced an important change post-SOX in our univariate analy-
sis. For instance, in Model 1 of Table 13, the coefficient of New_OptionG is negative and 
significant at the 1% level but its interaction with SOX is positive and significant at the 
5% level. Before SOX, one standard deviation increase in new option grants decreases 
2yABHR by 4.7%. However, post-SOX a similar change in new option grants improves 
2yABHR by 0.4%, a 16% change relative to its mean. Similarly, in Model 7 one standard 
deviation increase in new option grants before SOX decreases TFP by 0.048, but post-SOX 
a similar change improves TFP by 0.005, an 18% change relative to its mean. On the other 
hand, we do not observe an important impact of risk-taking incentives on synergies and 
ROA, which our univariate analysis in Table 12 shows have not been significantly affected 
by the passage of SOX.
What is worth noting is that these effects on deal performance have been transmitted 
through the same incentive channels that have been affected by SOX. As shown in our 
preceding analysis, the risk appetite of managers has decreased in the new regulatory envi-
ronment via an important switch in the way they perceive risk-taking incentives provided 
by their option portfolio. In this section, we show that it is the same part of managerial 
compensation portfolio that drives improvements in long-term stock price performance 
and total factor productivity post-SOX. New option grants (Models 1 and 7), accumulated 
unexercised options (Model 8) and Vega (Models 3 and 9) are negatively associated with 
2yABHR and D_TFP before SOX but the passage of the Act has significantly improved 
their impact on these performance measures. In contrast, we do not observe any important 
effect of managerial stock portfolio on deal performance post-SOX.
Overall, our results are supportive to the prediction that managers have responded to 
SOX in a value-enhancing manner. By discouraging investment in risky-projects, SOX has 
improved the efficiency of option-based incentives with regard to the quality of acquisition 
decisions. The passage of the Act has made excessively risky project less attractive to man-
agers due to the higher underlying likelihood of value destruction switching their focus to 
less risky but value-enhancing choices. This is consistent with the view that excessive risk-
taking can have an adverse impact on performance (Shen and Zhang 2013; Bennett et al. 
2015). In addition, we show that both the reduction in risk-taking activity and the improve-
ments in stock-price performance and total factor productivity are driven by the executives’ 
option portfolio.
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Table 11  Multivariate analysis of change in acquisition risk by year post-SOX
Variable D_Risk Model 1 D_Risk Model 2 D_Risk Model 3
Intercept  − 0.2601  − 0.2487  − 0.2608
(− 1.21) (− 1.15) (− 1.21)
New_Grants 0.1349**
(2.04)
New_Grants*SOX2002b  − 1.1075***
(− 4.31)
New_Grants*SOX2003  − 0.2956**
(− 2.29)






New_OptionG*SOX2002b  − 1.1624***
(− 4.65)
New_OptionG*SOX2003  − 0.3863***
(− 3.16)














SOX2002b  − 0.1721  − 0.2120*  − 0.7720***
(− 1.27) (− 1.71) (− 11.12)
SOX2003  − 0.2335***  − 0.2240***  − 0.3911***
(− 3.40) (− 3.93) (− 9.95)
SOX2004 0.0638 0.0533  − 0.1425***
(1.13) (1.13) (− 4.09)
SOX2005  − 0.1679**  − 0.1345**  − 0.1306***
(− 2.49) (− 2.52) (− 3.50)
Number of observations 6434 6434 6434
F-statistic 7.91*** 8.01*** 7.73***
R-squared 0.086 0.087 0.084
Control variables YES YES YES
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES
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Table 11  (continued)
The table presents multivariate analysis of the change in risk of acquiring firms included in the sample of 
7747 acquisitions completed during the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. 
Variable definitions are presented in Table 14. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively
Table 12  SOX and acquisition performance
The table presents changes in deal performance surrounding the passage of SOX. The sample is 7747 com-
pleted U.S. acquisitions over the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. Stock 
price data are from CRSP. 2yrABHR is the 2-year daily buy-and-hold return of the acquiring firm beginning 
one day following the acquisition effective date minus the return of a matched firm over the same period. 
Firms are matched by industry, year, size and book-to-market ratio from a universe of firms that have not 
been involved in any acquisition activity for a period of 3 years surrounding the deal effective date. Syner-
gies is the total dollar gains for the bidder and the target from the transaction calculated as the market value 
of equity 6 trading days before the acquisition announcement date times the cumulated abnormal returns 
over an 11-day window surrounding the announcement date (-5, + 5) for each firm. D_TFP is the change in 
total factor productivity (TFP) from the end of the year preceding the acquisition announcement to the end 
of the year following the completion of the deal. Firm-year TFP data is from İmrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014). 
D_ROA is the difference in the return on assets of the acquiring firm from the end of the year preceding the 
acquisition announcement to the end of the year following the completion of the deal. Acquisitions with 
an announcement date after July 30, 2002 belong to the post-SOX period, otherwise they belong to the 
pre-SOX period. t-statistics are from the t-test of difference between means and z-statistics are from the 
Wilcoxon rank sum test for difference between the respective distributions. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively
Compensation variable Total sample Pre SOX Post SOX Difference post vs pre z/t Statistics
2yrABHR (%)
Mean 2.63*** 5.54***  − 0.86  − 6.40***  − 3.62
Median 1.15*** 2.71***  − 0.54  − 3.25***  − 2.64
Observations 6889 3759 3130
Synergies ($ million)
Mean 79.65 90.54 65.86  − 24.68  − 0.21
Median 27.97*** 30.79*** 26.74**  − 4.05  − 0.67
Observations 1618 904 714
D_TFP
Mean  − 0.029***  − 0.035***  − 0.022*** 0.013 1.52
Median  − 0.003*** 0.008  − 0.015***  − 0.023* 1.95
Observations 4827 2545 2282
D_ROA (%)
Mean  − 1.47***  − 1.59***  − 1.32*** 0.27 1.59
Median  − 0.34***  − 0.37***  − 0.31*** 0.06 1.62
Observations 7011 3946 3065
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7  Summary and conclusions
Our study reveals an important weakening in the relation between incentive compensation 
and risk-taking activity after the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. While changes in 
acquisition risk can be partly explained by changes in the structure of executive compensa-
tion, our empirical analysis identifies a statistically significant change in the effect of incen-
tive compensation on managerial behavior after the introduction of SOX. Prior to SOX, 
executives who receive a higher proportion of their compensation through equity-based 
incentives are more likely to engage in acquisitions that increase firm risk. However, SOX 
changed the way managers respond to equity incentives with some high-incentivized man-
agers becoming more risk-averse after SOX.
When incentive compensation is disaggregated into its individual components, the 
change in managerial behavior is driven by the executives’ option portfolio. On the other 
hand, common stock grants cannot explain differences in risk-taking activity between the 
pre- and post-SOX periods. Our results are robust to alternative definitions of firm risk, 
different specifications of managerial incentives, additional controls for changes in board 
governance surrounding SOX, and remain unchanged after controls for endogeneity.
Acquisitions are, in general, risky investment decisions. In a period characterized by 
higher personal costs and increased regulatory scrutiny, managers have responded to SOX 
in a value-enhancing manner. They make acquisition decisions that have a smaller impact 
on the volatility of their firm stock returns relative to the pre-SOX period benefiting, at 
the same time, shareholders in the long run. The positive impact on long-term stock price 
performance and total factor productivity has been transmitted through the same incentive 
mechanism that has been affected by the passage of SOX: the executives’ option portfolio.
Appendix
See Tables 14 and 15.
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Table 14  Variable definitions
Compensation variables
New_Grants The Black–Scholes fair value of new options and restricted stock grants awarded to the 
acquirer’s top five executives as a percentage of their total compensation in the year 
preceding the acquisition announcement from ExecuComp
New_OptionG The fair value of new executive stock options awarded to the acquirer’s top five execu-
tives as a percentage of their total compensation in the year preceding the acquisition 
announcement from ExecuComp
New_StockG The fair value of restricted stock grants awarded to the acquirer’s top five executives 
as a percentage of their total compensation in the year preceding the acquisition 
announcement from ExecuComp
Accum_Incentives The sum of unexercised stock options and unvested restricted stock held by the top five 
executives as a percentage of the total number of shares outstanding at the end of the 
year preceding the acquisition announcement from ExecuComp
Unex_Options The ratio of unexercised stock options held by the top five executives to the total num-
ber of shares outstanding at the end of the year preceding the acquisition announce-
ment from ExecuComp
Unvest_Stock The ratio of unvested restricted stock grants held by the top five executives to the 
total number of shares outstanding at the end of the year preceding the acquisition 
announcement from ExecuComp
Delta The dollar change in the wealth of top five executives for a 1% change in the firm’s 
stock price in the year preceding the acquisition announcement from ExecuComp
Vega The dollar change in the wealth of top five executives for a 1% change in the standard 
deviation of firm’s stock returns in the year preceding the acquisition announcement 
from ExecuComp
Cash_Comp The sum of salary and bonus payments to the top five executives scaled by total com-
pensation in the year preceding the acquisition announcement from ExecuComp
Pred_New_Grants The predicted value of new options and restricted stock grants awarded to the 
acquirer’s top five executives as a percentage of their total compensation in the year 
preceding the acquisition announcement. Predicted values of equity incentives are 
estimated following the model of Core and Guay (1999)
Pred_New_OptionG The predicted value of new options grants awarded to the acquirer’s top five executives 
as a percentage of their total compensation in the year preceding the acquisition 
announcement. Predicted values of stock option grants are estimated following the 
model of Core and Guay (1999)
Pred_New_StockG The predicted value of restricted stock grants awarded to the acquirer’s top five execu-
tives as a percentage of their total compensation in the year preceding the acquisition 
announcement. Predicted values of restricted stock grants are estimated following the 
model of Core and Guay (1999)
Pred_Delta The predicted change in pay-performance sensitivity of the acquirer’s top five execu-
tives from year t − 1 to year t where t is the acquisition announcement date. Predicted 
values of pay-performance sensitivity are estimated following the model of Core and 
Guay (1999)
Pred_Vega The predicted change in pay-risk sensitivity of the acquirer’s top five executives from 
year t − 1 to year t where t is the acquisition announcement date. Predicted values of 
pay-risk sensitivity are estimated following the model of Core and Guay (1999)
Risk measures
D_Risk The change in the standard deviation of acquirer’s stock return between 6 months 
following the effective date (+ 1 to + 126 days) and 6 months preceding the effective 
date (− 126 to − 1 days) from CRSP
D_Risk_AbR The change in the standard deviation of acquirer’s abnormal stock returns between 
6 months following the effective date (+ 60 to + 185 days) and 6 months preceding 
the acquisition announcement date (− 185 to − 60 days) from CRSP. Abnormal stock 
returns are calculated as the residual from the market model using the CRSP value-
weighted index
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Table 14  (continued)
D_Risk_PSM The volatility of acquirer’s excess stock returns for a 6-month period following the 
effective date (+ 60 to + 185 trading days) minus the volatility of acquirer’s excess 
stock returns for a 6-month period preceding the announcement date (− 185 to − 60 
trading days). Excess returns are calculated as the bidder’s daily returns minus those 
of the propensity-score matched firm for the same period
Performance measure
2yrABHR The bidder’s 2-year buy-and-hold daily returns following the acquisition effective date 
minus the 2-year buy-and-hold daily returns of the matched firm for the same time 
period from CRSP
Synergies The total dollar gains for the bidder and the target from the transaction calculated 
as the market value of equity 6 trading days before the acquisition announcement 
date times the cumulated abnormal returns over an 11-day window surrounding the 
announcement date (− 5, + 5) for each firm. Cumulated abnormal returns are based 
on the market model using the CRSP value-weighted index
D_TFP The change in total factor productivity (TFP) from the end of the year preceding the 
acquisition announcement to the end of the year following the completion of the 
deal. Firm-year TFP data is from İmrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014). Positive values 
indicate an improvement in TFP
D_ROA The difference in the return on assets (ROA) of the acquiring firm from the end of 
the year preceding the acquisition announcement to the end of the year following 
the completion of the deal. Positive values indicate an improvement in operation 
performance
Deal characteristics
SOX A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquisition announcement date is 
after the enactment of Sarbanes–Oxley Act (July 30, 2002) and zero otherwise
SOX2002b A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquisition announcement date is 
within the period August 01, 2002–December 31, 2002 and zero otherwise
SOX2003 A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquisition announcement date is 
within the calendar year 2003 and zero otherwise
SOX2004 A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquisition announcement date is 
within the calendar year 2004 and zero otherwise
SOX2005 A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquisition announcement date is 
within the calendar year 2005 and zero otherwise
Internet_Crash The decile ranking of stock price performance between August 1, 2000 and August 31, 
2001 for firms with an acquisition announcement date during this period, and zero 
for acquisitions that take place outside of this period. Decile 1 corresponds to the 
best performing firms
SFAS_123R A dummy variable set equal to one if the acquisition announcement is made in 2006 
and zero otherwise
Financial_Crisis The decile ranking of stock price performance between January 1, 2007 and December 
31, 2009 for firms with an acquisition announcement date during this period, and 
zero for acquisitions that take place outside of this period. Decile 1 corresponds to 
the best performing firms
Payment_Cash A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the deal is financed entirely with cash 
and zero otherwise from SDC Platinum
Payment_Stock A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the deal is financed only with equity 
and zero otherwise from SDC Platinum
Diversifying A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquiring firm and the target oper-
ate in different industries and zero otherwise based on the Fama and French (1997) 
classification of 48 industries
Hostile A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the deal is characterized by SDC as 
hostile or unsolicited and zero otherwise
Public A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the target is a publicly listed firm and 
zero otherwise
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Table 14  (continued)
Private A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the target is a privately held firm and 
zero otherwise
Relative_Size The ratio of the deal value reported in SDC Platinum to the market value of the acquir-
ing firm 4 weeks before the acquisition announcement date from CRSP
Acquisition A dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has made an acquisition 
announcement in a given year and zero otherwise
Firm characteristics
Size The natural logarithm of bidder’s market value of equity 4 weeks before the acquisition 
announcement date from CRSP
Runup The acquirer’s buy-and-hold daily returns between 205 and 6 days before the acquisi-
tion announcement date minus the buy-and-hold daily returns of the matched firm for 
the same time period from CRSP
Past_ABHR The market-adjusted buy-and-hold daily returns of the firm for the calendar year from 
CRSP. Market returns are from the CRSP value-weighted index
Cash/Assets The acquirer’s cash and cash equivalents to book value of total assets at the end of the 
year preceding the acquisition announcement from Compustat
ROA The operating income of the acquiring firm before depreciation divided by book value of 
total assets at the end of the year preceding the acquisition announcement from Compustat
Sales_Growth The logarithm of the ratio of bidder’s sales in the year preceding the acquisition 
announcement (t − 1) to sales in the previous year (t − 2) from Compustat
D_Leverage The change in the ratio of acquirer’s total debt to total assets from the end of the year 
preceding the acquisition announcement to the end of the year when the acquisition 
is announced from CRSP
Leverage Total debt to total assets at the end of the year preceding the acquisition announcement 
from Compustat
B/M The book value of equity from Compustat divided by its market value at the end of the 
year preceding the acquisition announcement from CRSP
R&D The acquirer’s research and development expenditure to book value of total assets at 
the end of the year preceding the acquisition announcement from Compustat
Net_PPE The acquirer’s net expenditure in property, plant and equipment to book value of total 
assets at the end of the year preceding the acquisition announcement from Compustat
CAPEX The capital expenditures of the acquiring firm divided by book value of total assets at 
the end of the year preceding the acquisition announcement from Compustat
P/E The ratio of the stock price to earnings per share at the end of the year preceding the 
acquisition announcement from CRSP/Compustat
NC_Working_Cap Current assets minus current liabilities minus cash and cash equivalents standard-
ized by book value of total assets at the end of the year preceding the acquisition 
announcement from Compustat
Tenure The number of months the CEO has served in this position at the time of the acquisi-
tion announcement from ExecuComp
Overconfidence The value per in-the-money vested option retained by the CEO from ExecuComp 
scaled by the stock price of the firm at the end of the fiscal year from Compustat. 
The value per in-the-money vested option is calculated as the value of all unexer-
cised exercisable options retained by the CEO divided by the total number of these 
options from ExecuComp
CEO/Chairman A dummy variable that takes that value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman of 
the acquiring firm are combined at the end of the year preceding the acquisition 
announcement and zero otherwise from ExecuComp
Indep_Directors The number of independent directors divided by board size from BoardEx
Audit_Indep The proportion of independent directors in the audit committee from BoardEx
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Table 15  Probit regressions of determinants of propensity to acquire
Variable Probit Model 1 Probit Model 2 Probit Model 3 Probit Model 4 Probit Model 5
Intercept  − 2.0374***  − 2.0640***  − 2.5996***  − 2.5999***  − 2.0823***

















Cash_Comp 0.0083*** 0.0079** 0.0023 0.0023 0.0025
(2.63) (2.50) (0.71) (0.71) (0.73)
SOX  − 0.0230  − 0.0058  − 0.0249  − 0.0262  − 0.0275
(− 1.10) (− 0.26) (− 1.19) (− 1.25) (− 1.29)
Size 0.0659*** 0.0677*** 0.1125*** 0.1125*** 0.0811***
(7.30) (7.46) (11.84) (11.84) (8.57)
Past_ABHR 0.0223* 0.0226* 0.0122 0.0121 0.0202
(1.70) (1.73) (0.92) (0.91) (1.52)
Cash/Assets 0.0978 0.0829 0.1502** 0.1526** 0.1715**
(1.40) (1.19) (2.17) (2.20) (2.46)
BM  − 0.1334***  − 0.1271***  − 0.1291***  − 0.1295***  − 0.1420***
(− 3.12) (− 3.00) (− 2.97) (− 2.98) (− 3.18)
ROA 0.0795 0.0839 0.0185 0.0183  − 0.0706
(0.82) (0.87) (0.19) (0.19) (− 0.72)
Sales_Growth 0.6279*** 0.6201*** 0.6451*** 0.6460*** 0.6876***
(6.64) (6.57) (6.75) (6.77) (7.07)
Leverage  − 0.1877**  − 0.1835**  − 0.2059***  − 0.2059***  − 0.1979***
(− 2.55) (− 2.49) (− 2.78) (− 2.78) (− 2.64)
P/E  − 0.0015  − 0.0016  − 0.0014  − 0.0014  − 0.0016
(− 0.27) (− 0.29) (− 0.25) (− 0.25) (− 0.29)
NC_Working_Cap 0.0827 0.0732 0.0810 0.0821 0.0736
(1.27) (1.12) (1.25) (1.26) (1.12)
Overconfidence 0.1677*** 0.1626*** 0.1643*** 0.1647*** 0.2034***
(5.34) (5.18) (5.21) (5.21) (6.17)
Chi-Square 563.88*** 572.76*** 525.79*** 526.08*** 502.38***
Observations 21,072 21,072 21,062 21,062 20,576
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